

Turing machines within Turing machines!

Descriptions of Turing Machines

It is possible to write down any Turing machine as a sequence of zeros and ones. This sequence describes everything about the Turing machine that we mentioned earlier – Q , A , and δ .

We call this the **description** of the Turing machine.

We abbreviate “the description of Turing machine M ” as just “ $\langle M \rangle$ ”.

Universal Turing Machines:

Alan Turing proved the existence of a “**Universal Turing Machine**” (let's call it U). The Universal Turing Machine *simulates other Turing machines*.

U takes as its input the description of *any* Turing machine, $\langle M \rangle$, followed by *any* input x . We call U the “Universal Turing Machine” because it can then simulate what M would do when M runs on the input x . $U(\langle M \rangle, x)$ produces exactly the same output as $M(x)$.

$$U(\langle M \rangle, x) = M(x)$$

The Halting Problem: *when Turingception goes wrong*

Remember how Turing machines can sometimes **loop**. Wouldn't it be cool if we had a program which can look at our programs and see if they have infinite loops? This is called the Halting Problem. *HALT* is the language of all Turing machines + inputs that halt.

Suppose we have a program which can do this. Let's call it P .

$$P(\langle M \rangle, x) = \begin{cases} \text{accept} & \text{if } M(x) \text{ halts} \\ \text{reject} & \text{if } M(x) \text{ loops} \end{cases}$$

It turns out that P cannot exist. The reason for this is again devious. We set up a program Q which contains a description of P , and uses that to do the exact opposite of whatever P predicts Q does:

$$Q(x) = \begin{cases} \text{loop} & \text{if } P(\langle Q \rangle, x) \text{ accepts} \\ \text{halt} & \text{if } P(\langle Q \rangle, x) \text{ rejects} \end{cases}$$

Q is something that P analyzes incorrectly, so P cannot exist.

There is no Turing machine that can decide *HALT*! The Halting Problem is **undecidable**.

SCOOPING THE LOOP-SNOOPER
A proof that the Halting Problem is undecidable
 Geoffrey K. Pullum

No general procedure for bug checks will do.
 Now, I won't just assert that, I'll prove it to you.
 I will prove that although you might work till you drop,
 you cannot tell if computation will stop.

For imagine we have a procedure called *P*
 that for specified input permits you to see
 whether specified source code, with all of its faults,
 defines a routine that eventually halts.

You feed in your program, with suitable data,
 and *P* gets to work, and a little while later
 (in finite compute time) correctly infers
 whether infinite looping behavior occurs.

If there will be no looping, then *P* prints out 'Good.'
 That means work on this input will halt, as it should.
 But if it detects an unstoppable loop,
 then *P* reports 'Bad!' — which means you're in the soup.

Well, the truth is that *P* cannot possibly be,
 because if you wrote it and gave it to me,
 I could use it to set up a logical bind
 that would shatter your reason and scramble your mind.

Here's the trick that I'll use — and it's simple to do.
 I'll define a procedure, which I will call *Q*,
 that will use *P*'s predictions of halting success
 to stir up a terrible logical mess.

For a specified program, say *A*, one supplies,
 the first step of this program called *Q* I devise
 is to find out from *P* what's the right thing to say
 of the looping behavior of *A* run on *A*.

If *P*'s answer is 'Bad!', *Q* will suddenly stop.
 But otherwise, *Q* will go back to the top,
 and start off again, looping endlessly back,
 till the universe dies and turns frozen and black.

And this program called *Q* wouldn't stay on the shelf;
 I would ask it to forecast its run on *itself*.
 When it reads its own source code, just what will it do?
 What's the looping behavior of *Q* run on *Q*?

If *P* warns of infinite loops, *Q* will quit;
 yet *P* is supposed to speak truly of it!
 And if *Q*'s going to quit, then *P* should say 'Good.'
 Which makes *Q* start to loop! (*P* denied that it would.)

No matter how *P* might perform, *Q* will scoop it:
Q uses *P*'s output to make *P* look stupid.
 Whatever *P* says, it cannot predict *Q*:
P is right when it's wrong, and is false when it's true!

I've created a paradox, neat as can be —
 and simply by using your putative *P*.
 When you posited *P* you stepped into a snare;
 Your assumption has led you right into my lair.


So where can this argument possibly go?
 I don't have to tell you; I'm sure you must know.
A reductio: There cannot possibly be
 a procedure that acts like the mythical *P*.

You can never find general mechanical means
 for predicting the acts of computing machines;
 it's something that cannot be done. So we users
 must find our own bugs. Our computers are losers!


Step 1: *P*



Step 2: *Q*



Step 3: ???



Step 4: Profit

